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Key EU Institutions 
 
European Parliament:  Legislature elected every five years by citizens of each Member State.  It 
shares legislative and budgetary authority with the Council and approves the final Community 
budget.  It also supervises the Commission. 
 
Council of the European Union: Includes representatives from each Member State and is the main 
decision making body of the EU.  It shares legislative and budgetary power with the European 
Parliament, coordinates economic policies and judicial matters, and makes decisions regarding EU 
foreign and security policy. 
 
European Commission: Presents and implements legislation approved by the Parliament and the 
Council.  It is the guardian of treaties and works together with the Court of Justice to ensure proper 
application of Community Law.  The Commission does not directly represent national governments 
but is an administrative body designed to promote the common interest.   
 
Court of Justice: Ensures that Community law is uniformly interpreted and effectively applied.  It 
has jurisdiction in disputes involving Member States, EU institutions, businesses, and individuals.  
 
Acronyms used in this report 
 
CAP:     Common Agriculture Policy 
EC:     European Commission 
ECJ:     European Court of Justice 
EESC:     European Economic and Social Committee 
EU:   European Union (used loosely to refer to the alliance that has evolved into the European 
Union, after several name changes) 
EURES:   European Employment Services 
EWC:     European Works Council 
FDI:     Foreign Direct Investment 
FTAA:     Free Trade Area of the Americas 
HCP:     Hemisphere Cooperation Program 
ILO:     International Labor Organization 
LFA:     Less Favored Areas 
NAALC:   North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 






1.  Development Funds 
 
From Europe there is strong evidence that 
regional economic arrangements can include 
mechanisms to reduce disparities among 
member nations.  The EU invested €324 
billion in development grants to reduce 
disparities between and within its member 
states between 1961 and 2001, most of it since 
the mid-1980s.  Accordingly, poorer 
European countries have made progress in 
catching up with their neighbors, and there is 
widespread consensus that EU aid grants were 
an important factor in that region’s trend 
towards reduced disparity.   By contrast, the 
European funds were roughly ten times the 
amount of U.S. economic assistance grants to 
all of Latin America during the same period.  
And, NAFTA contained no mechanisms 
whatsoever to reduce inequalities.  As Ireland 
and the other formerly poor European 
nations have surged forward, Mexico has 
fallen further behind its NAFTA partners.   
 
The general lesson for the Americas is that 
trade and investment liberalization alone do 
not guarantee a narrowing of the economic 
divide.  This said, there are many questions 
that should be explored regarding the most 
appropriate approach to resource transfer in 
the Americas.  It may be that debt reduction, 
or a combination of debt reduction and aid 
would be a more appropriate approach.   
 
The EU also offers lessons on how to 
develop and maintain support for 
development aid in the richer countries.  This 
has been accomplished by “de-politicizing” 
aid by assigning responsibility for 
administration to a supra-national body (the 
European Commission) and by allowing a 
portion of aid to be channeled into the poorer 
regions of the richer countries. 
I.  SUMMARY 
 
As criticism mounts in the Americas over what many perceive to be an overly narrow 
approach to integration, there is growing interest among political leaders and citizen groups to 
learn more from the most advanced regional integration project in the world:  the European 
Union.  We list below a summary of what we judge to be the most important lessons in five 
issue areas from the European experience that may be relevant for the Americas. 
 
 
2.  Migration 
 
EU citizens enjoy the right of freedom of 
movement from one member state to 
another.  In response to fears of massive 
flows of migrants into the richer countries, 
the EU has focused aid and other assistance 
to lift up living standards in poorer countries 
to mitigate migration pressures.  As a result, 
when the EU lifted borders with Portugal and 
Spain, out-migration was negligible.  Even 
though the EU is confronting wider income 
gaps in the current round of enlargement, 
countries scheduled to join the EU in May 
2004 are slated to enjoy full rights to freedom 
of movement within seven years.  By contrast, 
NAFTA side-stepped the migration issue, 
aside from offering limited visas for 
professionals.  There is a great deal the 
Western Hemisphere can learn from the EU 
approach in adopting a long-term plan for 
leveling the playing field among nations and 
working towards increased labor mobility. 
 
3.  Agriculture 
 
The lessons of the EU on agriculture are 
mixed.  For the first two decades or so, the 
EU approach centered on boosting yields and 
production levels.  This exacerbated a 
problem of massive surpluses that drove 
down world market prices for many 
commodities.  It also encouraged intensive 
farming practices that had substantial negative 
environmental impacts.  And despite massive 
spending (€672 billion between 1963 and 
2001), the EU also experienced a rapid decline 
in small farms, since subsidies 
disproportionately benefited large producers.   
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Even if the results had been more positive, it 
would be unrealistic to propose such an 
expensive approach to agricultural policy in 
the Americas.  However, more recent 
attempts to reform the EU agricultural policy, 
while too early to judge, may prove more 
fruitful.  These changes have focused on de-
linking subsidies from production and 
conditioning them on respect for 
environmental and other standards.  The EU 
is also planning to cut payments to large 
farmers.  These reforms can inform the 
debate in the Americas region, where small-
scale agriculture remains highly significant in 
terms of employment, as well as social, 
environmental, and cultural welfare.  Like the 
EU, the Western Hemisphere should 
recognize that increased exports and other 
trade liberalization policies will not solve the 
serious problems facing rural residents. 
 
4.  Social and Environmental Standards 
 
One overall lesson of the EU is that 
development aid, trade and foreign 
investment are most effective when 
accompanied by social and environmental 
protections.  NAFTA lacks strong 
mechanisms on these issues and as a result, 
corporations, particularly in Mexico, continue 
to profit through severe labor repression and 
environmental degradation.  Through EU-
wide standards on labor rights, gender equity, 
racial discrimination, health and safety, 
environment and other issues, the EU has 
helped promote a high-road path to 
development.   
 
The EU model also offers lessons on how to 
handle enforcement of social and 
environmental standards in a way that 
promotes compliance, including through 
financial and technical assistance, rather than 
rushing to penalize violators.  At the same 
time, there are those who have been frustrated 
by the slow pace of justice against violators of 






5.  Public Participation 
 
The EU offers several avenues for civil 
society input in policymaking.  Two of the 
most significant are:  1) the European 
Economic and Social Committee, which is 
made up of representatives of employers, 
workers, and other civil society sectors from 
each member state and provides input to the 
European Commission, and 2) the social 
partnership process, in which trade unions 
and employer groups develop proposals for 
EU initiatives, including some that have led to 
legislation.  EU employees of multinational 
companies also have rights to consultation at 
the company level.   
 
While all of these mechanisms have their 
shortcomings, the EU has made some 
progress towards creating an institutional 
framework for ensuring that policies reflect a 
measure of public consensus.  By contrast, 
neither the NAFTA nor the proposed FTAA 
offer any opportunities for civil society 
participation in decision-making.   
 
The EU model is not without flaws.  
Moreover, there are historical, economic and 
cultural differences between Europe and the 
Americas that would make it both foolhardy 
and unrealistic to attempt to simply replace 
the NAFTA model with the EU approach.  
However, as talks on the FTAA as well as at 
the World Trade Organization flounder, our 
leaders would do well to broaden their 
discussions to consider alternative 
approaches, including that of the EU.   
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During the past few years, citizens 
organizations in Latin America have 
confronted governments with a growing 
record of negative social and environmental 
consequences from decades of market-
opening policies.  Leaders associated with 
these policies were voted or driven out of 
office in Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador and 
Bolivia, and the new Presidents of Brazil and 
Argentina are particularly critical of the 
proposed FTAA.  In Venezuela, President 
Hugo Chavez has also been a consistent critic, 
while leaders of Caribbean nations have 
demanded strong concessions for small 
economies.  Even Mexican President Vicente 
Fox, one of the United States’ closest 
economic allies, has conceded at times that if 
he had the chance to re-negotiate NAFTA, he 
would take a different approach.   
 
The growing backlash had a clear impact on 
FTAA negotiations in November 2003 at a 
meeting of lead trade negotiators in Miami.  
Facing a deadlock in the talks, the U.S. 
government backed down from its demand 
that the FTAA be a comprehensive agreement 
endorsed in full by all 34 governments.  
Instead, they agreed to a two-track approach 
that would allow countries to opt out of some 
of the more controversial areas.  At this point, 
the details of the new approach are yet to be 
determined, but it is clear that resistance from 
developing country governments has shaken 
up the debate.  Unless the U.S. government 
launches a successful arm-twisting campaign, 
the FTAA is likely to be a hollowed out 
version of the original vision.   
 
But while the hemisphere appears to have 
digressed from the NAFTA path, the road 
ahead is unclear.  Leaders are far from 
achieving consensus around an alternative 
road map for integration in the Americas.  
One frequent theme, however, is that the 
Western Hemisphere should consider the 
experience of the European Union (EU).  
This message has been most explicit in 
statements by the governments of Mexico and 
Venezuela.  Mexico’s Fox has promoted the 
idea that both the NAFTA and the FTAA 
include EU-style development funds and that 
the NAFTA countries follow the EU by 
adopting a common currency and more liberal 
migration policies.  The Chavez 
administration in Venezuela issued a memo 
stating that “one of the key goals of a 
successful integration project, as 
demonstrated by the experience of the 
European Union, is to ensure that integration 
allows for concrete steps to be taken towards 
significantly reducing these inequalities.”1  As 
the Western Hemisphere grapples with its 
own integration process, the EU offers one of 
the few concrete examples of an alternative 
approach.   
II.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The debate over economic integration is more robust and less predictable today than at any 
point in the past decade.  This is particularly the case in the Americas.  Since 1994, 34 
countries in the Western Hemisphere (all but Cuba) have been engaged in talks around a 
proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas.  Until recently, the model for the FTAA, as 
evidenced by draft texts, has been the North American Free Trade Agreement.  However, 
while the official January 2005 deadline for completing the FTAA is fast approaching, the 
U.S. government’s goal of a NAFTA-style agreement appears more remote than ever.   
 
This report lays out some of the main 
differences between the NAFTA and EU 
experiments and attempts to draw some 
lessons from the European experience that 
might be relevant to the debate in the 
Americas.  The two approaches are indeed 
quite distinct.  In short, NAFTA is a narrow, 
free market-oriented agreement that combines 
trade and investment liberalization with strong 
investor protections.  By contrast, the EU has 
never been just about economics.  Built on 
the ashes of World War II, it has the dual 
goals of economic prosperity as well as social 
and political harmony.  And to promote the 
latter, EU architects have developed 
mechanisms to reduce disparities, established 
legally binding social and environmental 
protections, and created numerous avenues 
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for civil society input into decision-making.  
They have also allowed free labor movement  
within the EU zone, while seeking to 
minimize migration pressures by narrowing 
gaps in living standards.   
 
To be clear, though, the EU is not without 
conflicts of its own.  In fact, there are raging 
debates over virtually every aspect of this 
complex project.  EU policies can roughly be 
grouped into two categories:  those that 
restrict government intervention and those 
that require it.  The restrictive policies include 
trade and investment liberalization, the 
adoption of the common currency (which is 
tied to restrictions on fiscal policy), 
competition policy (which restricts 
government subsidies to the private sector) 
and free movement of labor (which inhibits 
restrictions on labor flows).  There are 
particularly contentious battles over EU 
restrictions on deficit spending and interest 
rate policies that were imposed as part of the 
adoption of the euro.  National government 
leaders and civil society groups alike have 
complained that these restrictions undermine 
democratic processes and pose unacceptable 
obstacles to achieving social goals.  
 
The other category of policies, those that 
involve government intervention, include the 
EU’s development aid and farm supports, 
social and environmental policies, and public 
participation and consultation mechanisms.  
This report focuses primarily on this set of 
initiatives because they are absent from the 
NAFTA model and are also those most 
frequently cited by government officials as 
well as civil society groups in the discussion 
around a more favorable alternative to the 
FTAA.  The report also discusses EU 
migration policy since this issue is of great 
interest in the Americas.  A comprehensive 
analysis of the policies that restrict 
government intervention is beyond the scope 
of this report.   
 
As the remainder of this report makes clear, 
almost all of these initiatives are contentious.  
Particularly as the EU has worked to prepare 
for its upcoming enlargement in May 2004 
from 15 to 25 members, there has been 
intense scrutiny of and debate on these issues.  
EU institutions and member state 
governments have grappled with conflicting 
views on such questions as whether and how 
to reform these initiatives and — perhaps 
most difficult — how to pay for them.   We 
present the issues in these debates in the 
pages that follow. 
These European debates have produced a rich 
body of thinking that should be more closely 
integrated into discussions in the Americas.  
The goal of this report is to summarize some 
of the weaknesses and strengths of the EU 
experience in order to draw lessons that could 
help guide the integration debate in the 
Americas.   
Key Elements of the EU and NAFTA Approaches 
  EU  NAFTA 
•  Trade and investment liberalization  •  Trade and investment liberalization 
•  Common currency  •  None 




•  Free labor mobility  •  Limited visas for professionals only 
•  Development funds  •  None 
•  Agriculture supports  •  None 
•  Enforceable social/environmental 
standards 





•  Official channels for public 
participation at regional level 
•  None 
* Included in NAFTA, but not in FTAA draft 
 




Venezuela’s “Bolivarian” Alternative 
 
Beginning in 2003, the Venezuelan government 
has promoted an alternative to the FTAA that 
includes several elements similar to the EU:  1) 
Structural Convergence Funds to finance 
infrastructure and services projects aimed at 
reducing inequalities among countries; 2) free 
movement of persons; and 3) the right to public 
participation in decision-making.  On social and 
environmental issues, it does not call for 
enforceable regional standards, but a guarantee 
that the FTAA would not jeopardize commitments 
made on these issues in other international treaties.  
Like the HSA proposal mentioned below, it differs 
from the EU approach in that it would allow 
national governments more authority to intervene 





Vicente Fox’s “NAFTA-Plus” 
 
In 2001, Mexican President Vicente Fox floated 
the notion of a “NAFTA-plus” that would include 
a North American development fund, common 
currency, and an agreement to increase labor 
mobility.  Fox also proposed an FTAA 
development fund to which all parties would 
contribute, based on a sliding scale.  His proposals 
have mostly fallen on deaf ears.  Although 
President Bush recently proposed a limited 
migration reform, this would provide only 
temporary work visas and it is not clear whether 
the plan will become law.  Referring to Fox’s 
proposed development fund, one U.S. official 
explained to the Los Angeles Times:   “we’re no 
longer in the business of Marshall Plans.”3   
 
Jorge Castañeda, who served as Fox’s Foreign 
Minister until 2003, in a recent article continued to 
press for a “North American Economic 
Community” with common policies on migration, 
economics, monetary convergence, security, 
energy cooperation, and agriculture.  He also called 
for an EU-style compensatory mechanism, but 
instead of supporting development projects as in 
the EU, he suggested that assistance be provided 
to displaced people in Mexico and unemployed 





A Sampling of Proposals for EU-style Initiatives in the Americas 
 
 
U.S.  Development Fund Proposals 
 
In November 2003, Rep. Bob Menendez (D-NJ) 
and Rep. Cass Ballenger (R-NC) introduced a bill 
in the U.S. House of Representatives to create a 
Social Investment and Economic Development 
Fund for the Americas.  The bill would provide 
$500 million per year over five years for 
investment in education, health care, and housing 
and economic development.  Unlike EU aid, this 
plan would channel resources through existing 
institutions — the U.S. Agency for International 
Development and the Inter-American 
Development Bank.  The bill also recommends 
that countries of the Western Hemisphere 
collectively make a similar level of contribution for 
the same purposes. 
 
American University professor Robert Pastor 
proposes a similar plan for a North American 
Investment Fund that would invest $200 billion in 
infrastructure in Mexico over the next decade, with 
the U.S. government contributing $9 billion per 
year and Canada $1 billion, conditioned on Mexico 
providing matching funds through increased tax 
revenues.  He also cites the IDB as a potential 





Hemispheric Social Alliance (HSA) 
 
The HSA is a network of trade unions and civil 
society networks from the Americas formed in 
1997 in opposition to the proposed FTAA and in 
support of alternative approaches to integration.  
Their consensus document “Alternatives for the 
Americas” supports many of the elements of the 
EU approach, including resource transfers to 
reduce disparities and enforceable social standards.   
 
It conflicts with the EU’s emphasis on market 
liberalization, instead calling for countries to have 
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A.  DEVELOPMENT FUNDS 
 
One of the starkest differences between the 
EU and the proposed FTAA is in their 
approach to inequality among and within 
nations.  The EU has had two periods of 
enlargement that involved nations with per 
capita incomes that were substantially below 
the other member states.  The first phase 
involved the accession of the “poor four” 
nations of Ireland (1973), Greece (1981), and 
Portugal and Spain (1986).  Second, the EU is 
currently preparing for enlargement in May 
2004 to include 10 new nations:  Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia
7  Development funds have been 
central to the inclusion of both sets of 
countries. 
 
The model for the draft FTAA, NAFTA, is 
based on the assumption that the reduction of 
trade and investment barriers alone is enough 
to lift living standards.  Thus, like NAFTA, 
the FTAA text contains no mechanisms to 
reduce disparities through aid or any other 
form of resource transfer. 
 
Under NAFTA, the only remotely relevant 
initiative was the establishment of the North 
American Development Bank (NADBank).  
Created simultaneously with NAFTA (but not 
an integral part of the pact), the NADBank 
was designed primarily to provide loans for 
environmental infrastructure projects along 
the U.S.-Mexico border and has had minimal 
impact.8  
 
In the FTAA talks, negotiators have paid lip 
service to the problem of inequality in their 
official declarations, but so far the only 
concrete development is the creation in 2002 
of the Hemispheric Cooperation Program 
(HCP). 9  This U.S.-backed program focuses 
not on reducing inequalities but on building 
“trade capacity” through such means as 
technical assistance to train government 
officials to participate in negotiations and 
implement FTAA commitments.  In 2002, the 
U.S. government allocated $102 million for 
the HCP, a miniscule amount compared to 
EU aid levels.  The U.S. Trade Representative 
has stated that additional funds may be 
available through the Inter-American 
Development Bank and private sector 
sources, but there is no binding commitment 
to support the program and it is separate from 
the FTAA text.  Critics charge that the 
program’s primary purpose is to buy support 
for the increasingly controversial proposed 
FTAA. 
III.   MAJOR FINDINGS 
 
The following six sections examine key components of the European approach to integration.  
Each section highlights the debates over these initiatives as well as implications for integration 
in the Americas.  We also include a section on Ireland’s experience under the EU, since it is 
widely perceived as the poorer nation which has reaped the most benefits. 
 
By contrast, the alliance that evolved into the 
European Union had an explicit commitment 
to reducing income disparities, beginning with 
its founding Treaty of Rome in 1957.  This 
Treaty established the European Social Fund 
and expressed the need to “strengthen the 
unity of their economies and to ensure their 
harmonious development by reducing the 
differences existing between the various 
regions and the backwardness of the less 
favoured regions.” 
 
The alliance began allocating development 
funds in 1960, but this assistance remained at 
relatively low levels until the 1980s, when 
Jacques Delors became President of the 
European Commission.  Appointed by 
French President Francois Mitterand, of the 
Socialist Party, Delors was instrumental in 
ramping up the EU’s efforts to address 
income disparities.  Through the 1987 Single 
European Act and the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty, he more than doubled the funds 
available, placing emphasis on regions where 
per capita GDP was less than 75 percent of 
the EU average.  Delors also reformulated 
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how programs were delivered, stressing social 
partnership among government, business and 
civil society and pushed for a larger role for 
local governments by emphasizing the 
principle of “subsidiarity,” which means that 
decisions in a political system should be taken 
at the lowest level possible.  The 1997 Treaty 
of Amsterdam reinforced the goal of reducing 
inequality.  Article 158 states:  “… the 
Community shall aim at reducing disparities 
between the development of various regions 
and the backwardness of the least favoured 
regions or islands, including rural areas.” 
 
Between 1961 and 2001, the EU funneled 
€324 billion in Structural Funds in the form of 
development grants into member states.10  
This is roughly ten times the amount of U.S. 
economic assistance grants to all of Latin 
America during this time period.  Some 88 
percent of the EU funds were allocated during 
the period 1988 – 2001.
11  Structural Funds 
make up the second-largest line item in the 
EU budget, after the Common Agricultural 
Policy, and are grants (not loans), which 
require national governments to provide a 
certain level of co-funding.  Although the 
Structural Funds transfer resources to the less 
wealthy, this assistance may not be used for 
income support.  Rather it is tied to specific 
investments designed to support economic 
growth, such as infrastructure development or 
training.  National governments develop 
proposals for programs in consultation with 
the European Commission. 
 
About 70 percent of Structural Funds goes to 
administrative units designated as “Objective 
1” regions because they have a GDP per 
capita less than 75 percent of the EU average.  
This includes regions in the richer countries.  
The EU in recent years has also contributed 
more than €3 billion per year towards helping 
the accession countries prepare for EU 
membership.  For the period 2004 to 2006, 
the EU has allocated an additional €22 billion 
for the 10 new member states.  No country 
may receive more than 4 percent of their 
GDP from Structural or Cohesion funds. 
 
Of the total development funds, Cohesion 
Funds to provide additional support to the 
initial “poor four” countries of Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal, and Greece totaled some 18 billion 




TYPES OF EU STRUCTURAL FUNDS 
 
Established 
% of Structural 
Fund Budget* 
European Regional Development Fund:  Promotes economic and 
social cohesion, primarily by co-financing productive investment leading 
to job creation; infrastructure; and activities of small- and medium-
enterprises. 
1975 46% 
European Social Fund:  Aims to prevent unemployment through 
education and promoting opportunities for women, youth, and long-term 
unemployed. 
1957 26% 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund:  Supports 
rural development and structural reform of the agriculture sector. 
1975 9% 
Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance:  Promotes sustainable 
balance between fishery resources and their exploitation. 
1994 2% 
Cohesion Fund:  Finances projects designed to improve the 
environment and develop transport infrastructure in member states where 
per capita GNP is below 90 percent of the EU average.  Thus far, these 
funds have gone only to the four poorer EU countries (Ireland, Greece, 
Spain and Portugal).  This will change with EU enlargement. 
1993 8% 
* Based on 2001 budget.  Total for Structural Funds that year:  €32 billion. 
 
Since they began receiving EU aid, all of the 
original “poor four” have experienced varying 
degrees of convergence with the richer EU 
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nations.  Ireland’s surge is by far the most 
dramatic.  Between 1982 and 2002, Irish GDP 
per capita increased from 64 percent to 131 
percent of the EU average.  Spain and 
Portugal have increased from 74 to 82 percent 
and 62 to 71 percent, respectively.  Greece’s 
experience has been more mixed.  While the 
country fell behind in the 1980s, it gained 
ground after it began receiving additional 
support through the Cohesion Fund in 1993.  
Since that year the country has narrowed the 
gap with the rest of the EU by 7 percentage 
points.12
 
Absent any resource transfers, NAFTA’s 
“poor partner,” Mexico, has gone in the 
opposite direction.  In 1982, Mexico’s per 
capita income amounted to 43 percent of the 
North American average.  That year marked 
the beginning of sweeping market reforms in 
Mexico, including privatization of state-
owned enterprises and trade and investment 
liberalization.  Ten years later, Mexico had 
slipped to 33 percent of the regional average.  
The 1994 initiation of NAFTA, which 
expanded and locked in Mexico’s market 
reforms, did nothing to reverse the trend.  By 
2002, Mexico’s per capita income had 
dropped to only 31 percent of the regional 
average.  In terms of wages, hourly 
compensation in Mexican manufacturing 
dropped from 15 percent of the U.S. average 
in 1993 to 11 percent in 2002.13
 
Admittedly, one factor in the narrowing of the 
gaps within the EU may have been Germany’s 
economic stagnation in the 1990s (in part due 
to the challenge of absorbing eastern 
Germany).  For the “poor four” it was likely 
easier to catch up with the EU average when 
the region’s largest economy was in the 
doldrums.  However, this is by no means a 
complete explanation.  A comparison of the 
“poor four” versus Mexico (instead of against 
their regional averages) reveals that the EU 
nations have all had higher rates of growth in 
GDP per capita since 1982.14   
 
There are a few critics who question whether 
EU supports deserve any credit for the “poor 
four’s” progress in catching up with their 
neighbors.  For example, in a book published 
REGIONAL CONVERGENCE AND NON-CONVERGENCE
GDP per capita as a % of Regional Average


































Source:  Calculated by the authors based on data in World Bank, World Development Indicators Online.  GDP in 
terms of purchasing power parity (current international $).
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by the World Bank, Michele Boldrin and 
Fabio Canova argue that the funds transfers 
had no significant effect, but rather that 
national policies such as market liberalization 
and openness to trade and investment were 
the key factors in sustained growth.15  This, 
however, is a minority view, reflected by the 
fact that EU governments have agreed to 
expand Structural Funds to the new EU 
members.  In defending the positive impact of 
the funds, the European Commission (EC) 
and others offer several points:   
 
•  Econometric studies indicate that the 
Structural Funds added around 10 percent 
to the GDP in Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal, and over 4 percent in Spain 
during the period 1989-1999.  Moreover, 
the EC claims that these Funds 
maintained or created 2.2 million jobs in 
these countries during this period.16   
 
•  With regard to Ireland, it is difficult to 
argue that market liberalization was the 
sole key to prosperity since the country 
has had a relatively open economy since 
the 1970s but did not become 
economically successful until the 1990s, 
the same time that it was benefiting from 
significant EU development aid.17 
 
•  If massive investment inflows were an 
automatic leveling agent, Mexico would 
have enjoyed similar positive trends as the 
“poor four.”  Every year since NAFTA 
went into effect, Mexico has received 
more than twice as much foreign direct 
investment as in previous years.  In 2001, 
net inflows hit a high of $25 billion, up 
463 percent since 1993.  That increase 
was far greater than those achieved by the 
“poor four,” except for Ireland.18   
 
•  EC officials claim that in addition to their 
impact on growth, the Structural Funds 
have helped improve governance.  
According to Garnier, “Through their 
planning, partnership, monitoring, 
evaluation, and control requirements or 
through specific programs, the Structural 
Funds have been instrumental in 
increasing efficiency in public 
administration.”19   
 
It is more difficult to measure whether EU 
development funds have helped narrow 
income gaps between rich and poor within 
countries.  The European Commission 
focuses on data from 1995 onwards, as figures 
prior to this period are inconsistent across 
borders.  However, even in the short 
timeframe of 1995 to 2001, the EU countries 
have on average narrowed the ratio of the 
income share of the top and bottom fifths of 
their populations from 5.1 to 4.4.20  
 
Ratio of income of top 20% of population  
to that of the bottom 20% of population 
 
Current EU members  1995 1997 1999 2001
Austria 4.0  3.6  3.7 3.5
Belgium 4.5  4.1  4.2 4.0
Denmark 3.1  2.9  3.2 3.1
Finland na  3.1  3.4 3.5
France 4.5  4.4  4.4 4.0
Germany 4.6  3.7  3.6 3.6
Greece 6.5  6.6  6.2 5.7
Ireland 5.1  5.0  4.9 4.5
Italy 5.9  5.3  4.9 4.8
Luxembourg 4.3  3.6  3.9 3.8
Netherlands 4.2  3.6  3.7 3.8
Portugal 7.4  6.7  6.4 6.5
Spain 5.9  6.5  5.7 5.5
Sweden na  3.1  3.2 3.4
United Kingdom  5.2  4.7  5.2 4.9
EU average  5.1  4.7  4.6 4.4
Source:  Eurostat.  
 
Official inequality data for North America are 
extremely sparse, but what is available 
suggests that in the United States and Mexico, 
income gaps are far larger than in any EU 
country and have widened during the NAFTA 
period.  In Mexico, the ratio between the 
income share of the bottom and top 20 
percent grew from 14.3 in 1996 to 17.0 in 
1998.  In the United States, the ratio grew 
from 9.3 in 1993 to 10.2 in 1997.  Canada’s 
gap rose slightly, from 5.2 in 1994 to 5.4 in 
1997.21
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EU Challenges 
 
Of course, EU members have varied records 
on income inequality.  The European 
Commission concedes that in Ireland and 
Spain, high national economic growth has 
actually widened disparities within regions of 
these countries.  There is some disagreement 
over the causes of this trend.  Carole Garnier, 
of the EC’s Economic and Financial Affairs 
Department, maintains that this is a natural 
result of faster progress in areas, usually urban 
centers, with higher growth potential.  Vasco 
Cal, of the EC’s Regional Policy Department, 
claims, on the other hand, that policymakers 
have the power to tackle regional disparities, 
but have chosen instead to funnel more funds 
into richer regions.  Both pointed out that 
while there has been some widening of gaps 
between areas of these countries, the poorer 
areas have nevertheless made progress in 
catching up with the rest of Europe.22
 
In addition to disparities within regions of 
countries, there are other persistent indicators 
of inequality.  For example, only 28 percent of 
Spain’s potential labor force has at least a high 
school diploma, compared to the EU average 
of 56 percent.23  In Ireland, half of single 
mothers live in poverty, compared with only 9 
percent in Finland.24  The challenge to level 
the playing field will be even greater with the 
coming enlargement.   
 
There has been a big debate within the EU 
over how to handle financial support for the 
new members.   Gaps are wider than in 
previous enlargements.  Whereas the “poor 
four” had GDP per capita levels of 60 percent 
or higher than the EU average when they 
became members, some of the new entrants 
are as far behind as Mexico is in the North 
American region.  For the four poorest 
among the accession countries, these rates are:  
Estonia (37.2 percent), Latvia (27.7 percent), 
Lithuania (31.0 percent), and Poland (36.1 
percent).  Two countries that are negotiating 
EU entry are also around this level:  Romania 
(28.2 percent) and Bulgaria (22.3 percent).
25  
Although some of the new entrants have far 
higher levels of per capita income, 90 percent 
of administrative regions in the EU candidate 
countries have per capita income levels below 
75 percent of the EU average.26
 
While this daunting challenge has sparked 
debate over how best to tackle the economic 
divide in an expanded EU, there has never 
been a question of whether assistance would 
be provided.  According to Cal, of the EC 
Regional Policy Department, a key factor in 
maintaining this commitment is the fact that 
funds are administered by a supra-national 
institution, the Commission, which is 
designed to represent the common interest, 
rather than national interests.  In addition, all 
member states contribute to a Community 
budget, which is then allocated on the basis of 
EU policies.  Some have criticized the 
Commission’s supra-national status because it 
is not directly accountable to the citizens.  But 
Cal maintains that “Without the Commission 
and the common budget, there would not be 
a Cohesion Policy.”  He explained that if the 
EU attempted to administer such a policy 
through an inter-governmental authority, 
national governments that saw themselves as 
losers would likely pull out, even though it 
might not be in their long-term interest.  
“This is not just about solidarity, but also self-
interest,” Cal said.  “What’s the point of 
having an agreement with countries without 
one buck in their pockets?” 27
 
Another important factor in maintaining 
public support for Structural Funds is the fact 
that significant amounts go to poor regions in 
richer countries which are net contributors.  
In fact, the three current member states that 
fall clearly below the EU average in GDP per 
capita (Greece, Spain, and Portugal) receive 
45 percent of funds, while Germany, the 
richest country in the bloc, receives one of the 
largest amounts, at 15 percent.  France and 
the United Kingdom receive 8 percent and 9 
percent, respectively.28  Christian Weise, of 
the European Commission’s Budget 
Department, explained that with the financial 
strain of EU enlargement, there has been a 
debate over whether to continue to allow the 
richer countries to receive Structural Funds, 
but for political purposes at least some funds 
will likely continue to be allocated to the 
poorer regions within the richer countries.29
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The experience of Ireland, often touted as the 
EU’s biggest success story, is worth a more 
detailed examination.  One of the poorest EU 
nations upon membership in 1973, Ireland 
became by the early 1990s a so-called “Celtic 
Tiger,” with the EU’s highest economic 
growth rates.  One of the country’s strongest 
achievements was the drop in unemployment 
from 17 percent in the mid-1980s to around 4 
percent in the late 1990s.  This job boom 
succeeded in reversing the trend of Irish 
emigration, as young people returned from 
abroad to take advantage of new 
opportunities, particularly in the rapidly 
expanding technology, pharmaceutical and 
financial sectors.  Another sign of the 
country’s reversal of fortune is the fact that it 
is now one of the largest contributors to 
developing country aid.  Ireland currently 
contributes 0.41 percent of GDP to aid, 
placing it sixth in the world.30  
 
There is a debate over the extent to which EU 
Structural Funds contributed to Ireland’s 
economic boom, but most agree that they 
were an important factor.  Particularly after 
the creation of the Cohesion Funds, aimed at 
the “poor four” EU nations, Ireland received 
the highest per capita level of EU funding of 
any member state.  Between 1974 and 2001, 
Ireland received a total of more than €16 
billion in Structural Funds.  Combined with 
EU agricultural supports, these funds 
averaged more than 5 percent of GNP 
throughout the 1990s.31
 
The EU Structural Funds in Ireland were 
divided between infrastructure (36 percent), 
education (28 percent), grants and subsidies 
for private industry (26 percent), and income 
support, particularly in rural areas (10 
percent).32  Two of the numerous “success 
stories” described on the European 
Commission’s web site include:  the upgrade 
of the railway link between Dublin and 
Belfast, Northern Ireland, 15 percent of 
which was paid for by the Cohesion Fund, 
and an urban renewal project in the Temple 
Bar neighborhood of Dublin.  The EU 
contributed the equivalent of €47 million to 
help transform this formerly rundown 
neighborhood into an artsy hotspot often 
referred to as “Ireland’s Soho.”   
IRELAND CASE STUDY 
 
 
Many analysts and government officials say 
that one of the most important impacts of EU 
funding was that it helped the country 
maintain high levels of investment in training 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s, when 
other Irish social programs were facing cuts.  
Since EU funds would cover 65 percent of 
training costs, the Irish Training and 
Employment Authority had an easier time 
justifying their expenditures.33  In the period 
1990-95, Ireland was second only to Sweden 
in the EU in terms of the share of GDP spent 
on an active labor market policy.34  According 
to Boyle, the EU training funds not only 
helped turn the country into a hi-tech 
investment magnet; it also helped galvanize 
community activists (from rural feminists to 
parish priests) who became engaged in 
developing strategies on how to best use the 
funds to combat unemployment.35
 
Several other factors related to EU 
membership were significant contributors to 
the economic boom: 
 
•  Access to EU Markets:  The Single 
European Act of 1987 lifted trade barriers 
within the Union, making Ireland an even 
more attractive site for U.S. producers 
eager to use the country as a platform for 
exporting to other EU member states.  
Ireland’s English-speaking and well-
trained workforce was also a draw for 
U.S. employers.  
 
•  Corporate Tax Breaks:  The Irish 
government used EU-funded grants and 
rock-bottom corporate taxes (now 12.5 
percent) to help attract a flood of foreign 
direct investment, particularly from the 
United States.  In the late 1990s, U.S. 
foreign direct investment amounted to 
more than 80 percent of the average 
annual total, and in 1999, products from 
U.S. firms made up 70 percent of 
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Ireland’s manufacturing exports.36  These 
exports are highly concentrated in 
computer hardware, software and 
pharmaceuticals.  In a March 2003 speech 
at the World Bank, Irish Prime Minister 
Bertie Ahern boasted that “Ireland 
currently is the largest exporter of 
software in the world and over two-thirds 
of the computers sold in Europe are 
made in Ireland.”37  
 
•  Social Partnership:  Beginning in 1987, 
the Irish government began negotiating 
with social partners to produce multi-year 
national agreements on wages, taxes, and 
other policies.  Initially, these agreements 
consisted primarily of the trade unions’ 
acceptance of moderate wage growth (for 
both public and private sector workers) in 
exchange for low taxes on wages.  These 
pacts have been credited with maintaining 
low levels of labor conflict and low 
inflation during most of the past decade.  
Over time, the social partnership process 
expanded in scope and participation.  In 
addition to unions and employers, 
farmers and community and voluntary 
(anti-poverty) groups engaged in the 
process.38  The substance of the 
agreements extended beyond wages and 
taxes to include social welfare payments, 
healthcare spending, education and other 
policies.  Non-union companies (which 
include many of the U.S. hi-tech firms) 
are not required to abide by the 
agreements, but an estimated 70 percent 
do nevertheless.  EU funding has also 
helped spread the social partnership 
approach to the local level, creating 
institutional frameworks for civic 
engagement in a wide array of community 
policies. 
 
Alan Dukes, former leader of Ireland’s 
conservative Fine Gael political party, believes 
Ireland’s experience with the EU’s broad 
social and economic integration process offers 
important lessons for Latin America.  Prior to 
joining the EU, Ireland was largely dependent 
on the British economy, providing its richer 
and larger neighbor with a cheap source of 
labor and food.  According to Dukes, “For 
the countries of Latin America, starting off to 
create an integrated market on a solely 
economic basis with the United States as the 
leading partner is a very dangerous enterprise.  
We had economic integration between Ireland 
and what’s now the UK from the beginning 
of the 19th century, and it worked very much 
against Irish interests.  Only when we joined 
the EU did we get on an equal footing.“39 
Since joining, Ireland’s dependence on Britain 
has dramatically declined.  In 1972, 61 percent 
of Irish exports went to the United Kingdom.  
By 1995, this had dropped to 28 percent.40
 
Complex Social Impacts 
 
Despite many signs of economic success, 
there is much disagreement over whether the 
boom fueled by EU aid and foreign direct 
investment was good for Ireland’s poor.  The 
Irish government points to declines in a 
measure of “consistent” poverty as a positive 
sign.  “Consistent” poverty indicates 
households that fall below relative income 
poverty lines and also lack one or more items 
on a list of basic indicators of deprivation.  
Between 1994 and 2000, the percentage of 
Irish households in consistent poverty fell 
from 15.1 percent to 6.2 percent.41  However, 
others argue that with rising living standards, 
it is valid to examine relative poverty levels.  
On this measure, there appears to have been a 
negative trend since the arrival of the Celtic 
Tiger, although only for the very bottom tier.  
While households falling below 60 percent of 
average income fell from 34.2 percent in 1994 
to 32.9 percent in 2000, those falling below 40 
percent of average income rose from 4.9 
percent to 11.8 percent.   
 
In terms of inequality, the picture is also 
complicated.  The Dublin-based Economic 
and Social Research Institute reports that 
while the share of disposable income of the 
richest 20 percent of households actually 
declined slightly between 1987 and 1998, 
those at the bottom also experienced a slight 
loss, as the middle gained.42  Many blame the 
lack of significant progress in reducing 
inequality on the national government.  
Although social spending rose during the 
boom period in absolute terms, it did not 
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keep pace with economic growth rates, nor 
with EU standards.  According to a paper by 
the European Economy Group, “In a clear 
contrast with its counterparts, the share of 
social protection expenditures in GDP of the 
Irish economy has recorded a significant 
reduction …Thus, it is now noticeably below 
the EU average.”43  Some point out that the 
public has been somewhat cushioned from 
the impact of low social spending while the 
country’s unemployment rate has been low, 
but this is already creeping up.   
 
The impact of EU funds on inequality appears 
to have been mixed.  In the rural sector, EU 
agricultural policy boosted farm incomes, but 
mostly to the benefit of large producers.  
Since price supports have been linked to 
production, the more a farmer produced, the 
more the volume of price support he or she 
received.  The economic pressure on small 
farmers has been somewhat offset by the fact 
that non-farm economic opportunities in rural 
areas have expanded.   
 
For women, on the other hand, EU 
membership has had clear benefits.  There is 
widespread agreement that the EU anti-
discrimination directives (see more in Section 
II.D) were particularly important for women 
in Ireland, where many say women’s roles 
upon EU accession in the 1970s were similar 
to those of other European women in the 
1940s.  According to Anne Marie McGauran, 
of the Gender Equality Unit in the Irish 
Department of Justice, “everything we have in 
Ireland in gender equality standards we got 
because of the EU.”44  Women’s participation 
in the labor force has increased from under 28 
percent in 1971 to 44 percent in 1999, while 
women’s average wage has increased from 
about 56 percent to 75 percent of men’s 
wages.45
 
It is understandable that there is 
disappointment that Ireland’s overall 
prosperity has not translated into an equally 
dramatic improvement in terms of poverty 
and inequality reduction.  However, it is 
noteworthy that Ireland has not experienced 
the rapid increase in inequality experienced by 
most other countries in the world during this 
period. 
 
Is Ireland’s Economic Progress 
Sustainable?   
 
When the current phase of EU Cohesion 
Funds expires in 2006, Ireland’s GNP per 
capita will be too high to qualify for further 
support.  The loss of EU aid, combined with 
the region’s enlargement to include countries 
that might prove to be strong competitors 
with Ireland, has contributed to already 
substantial fears about the future of the 
nation’s economy.   
 
In 2001, FDI levels began dropping and since 
2002, there has been a wave of confidence-
rattling layoffs by multinational firms.  In July 
2003, the government announced that tax 
revenues for the year were expected to be 
€500 million less than forecast.46  This 
announcement added weight to a common 
criticism that Ireland’s low-tax strategy, while 
attractive to foreign firms, undermines the 
government’s capacity to address poverty or 
make continued investments in infrastructure 
and training that could support continued 
growth.  Currently, Ireland has no residential 
property taxes, Europe’s lowest corporate tax 
rate, and low income taxes.  At the same time, 
EU constraints on deficit spending and 
borrowing leave few alternatives for 
stimulating the economy.   
 
Peadar Kirby, of Dublin City University, says 
he is extremely concerned about the future, 
stressing the vulnerability created by Ireland’s 
reliance on FDI, its narrow tax base, and 
growing inequality.  “Ireland’s economy has 
been the most successful in the EU, and yet 
virtually overnight we’re in dire straits.”47  On 
the other hand, Kirby argues that the country 
will benefit from the fact that the government 
has maintained a strong role in industrial 
policy and unlike most nations in Latin 
America, rejected major privatization of its 
relatively large public sector, particularly in 
public utilities and transport.  This, he 
explains, is due to the fact that Irish politics is 
consensus-based and the unions, particularly 
in the public sector, are very strong.  
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Prime Minister Ahern claims that Ireland’s 
highly skilled workforce will help ensure 
economic sustainability:  “we now recognize 
that mobile foreign investment seeking low 
cost, low skilled workers is no longer one of 
our target markets.  We now focus on 
advanced manufacturing or office based 
activities to a great extent demanding high 
skills and doing high value work, often 
connected to research activity.”  Nevertheless, 
there is widespread concern that Ireland may 
lose foreign investment to competitors from 
India and other emerging markets, while 
Ireland’s indigenous business sector remains 
weak. 
 
These fears are particularly strong as the 
country prepares for the transition to net 
contributor to EU development funds.  
According to Liam Ryan, of the National 
University of Ireland, “the true test of 
Ireland’s love affair with Europe will come 
only when we are asked to be contributors 
rather than recipients, when we must put away 
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B.  MIGRATION 
 
The EU Model 
 
One consequence of the EU’s per capita 
income convergence is that people are not as 
pressed to leave home in search of economic 
opportunities.  Since 1968, EU citizens have 
been able to exercise the right to freedom of 
movement from one member state to 
another.  The EU also bans governments 
from discriminating against citizens of 
another member state.  This means that if a 
migrant worker becomes unemployed, he or 
she is eligible for all benefits a state guarantees 
to its own citizens.  EU citizens also enjoy the 
right to vote and run as candidates in 
municipal and European Parliament elections 
in all member states. 
 
These “open border” policies have not been 
entirely non-controversial.  During the early 
negotiations over the enlargement to include 
the “poor four,” there was much fear of a 
flood of brain-draining migration, especially 
from Spain and Portugal.  According to the 
U.S. Department of Labor, average 
manufacturing wages in 1980 in all four 
countries were less than half the level in West 
Germany.  Portugal was the lowest, at 16 
percent.49  Hundreds of thousands of Spanish 
and Portuguese workers had already sought 
employment in the manufacturing-intensive 
regions of France, Germany, and Switzerland.  
Thus, while both Iberian nations became 
official members in 1986, the EU postponed 
their right to free labor mobility until 1991.  
During this transition phase, EU structural 
funds and other supports, combined with a 
surge in private foreign direct investment, 
helped improve economic opportunities and 
social standards to the point where emigration 
pressures subsided.   
 
In stark contrast to the predictions prior to 
EU accession, Spain and Portugal not only did 
not flood the rest of the Union with migrants, 
they turned into labor-importing countries.  
Native Spaniards and Portuguese who once 
sought work in Northern Europe in droves 
found increased job opportunities at home.  
In Spain, net migration levels dropped 90 
percent from the period 1962-64 to the period 
1990-1994.50  Moreover, workers unable to 
find work in Spain were able to stay in their 
communities because of higher levels of social 
protection.51   
 
Throughout the EU, migration levels are low.  
Eurostat reports that during the period 1990 
to 2002, annual net migration in the EU 
ranged from 1.3 to 3.5 inhabitants per 1,000.52  
In fact, migration rates have been so low that 
ten years ago the European Commission 
created a special program, called the 
EURopean Employment Services (EURES) 
network, to help workers and even non-
workers take advantage of their right to 
freedom of movement.  EURES provides 
employment information and counseling, as 
well as recruitment services.   
 
It must be noted that the EU’s openness to 
migrants does not extend to those from non-
member states and in fact barriers to entry 
from outside the EU are high.  However, the 
EU will soon be allowing migrants from new 
member states in Eastern Europe free labor 
mobility.  As in the 1980s, there are once 
again concerns about the potential impact of 
open borders with countries that have much 
lower average wage levels than current 
member states.  In fact, the gaps in per capita 
income between current and new members 
are far greater than during expansion to the 
“poor four.”  As a consequence, the EU is 
allowing once again for a transition period of 
up to seven years during which the current 
EU member states may restrict migration 
from new member countries.  However, most 
EU countries have agreed to grant unlimited 
access immediately upon accession in May 
2004. 
 
The NAFTA Approach 
 
By contrast, NAFTA granted increased 
mobility only to professionals.  Moreover, the 
deal set limits on the number of temporary 
visas to be granted by the United States to 
eligible Mexican professionals (but not on 
Canadians).  NAFTA promoters argued that 
trade and investment liberalization would lead 
to such great improvements in Mexican living 
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standards that migration pressures would 
subside.  Just the opposite has occurred.  The 
U.S. government estimates that the number of 
unauthorized Mexican immigrants in the 
United States grew from 2 million in 1990 to 
4.8 million in 2000, with the highest growth 
occurring in the years after NAFTA went into 
effect. 53 This is in spite of the billions of 
dollars spent by the U.S. government every 
year to patrol its borders and an increase in 
U.S. border patrol agents from less than 4,000 
to more than 9,000 since NAFTA began.  
Because of tighter security, Mexicans 
attempting to cross illegally take increasingly 
dangerous routes, and hundreds lose their 
lives every year in remote areas. 
 
Herbert Bruecker, an immigration expert at 
the German Institute for Economic Research, 
emphasizes that one lesson for the debate 
over migration policy in the Americas context 
is that free labor movement creates higher 
incentives for return migration.  “Otherwise, 
workers have something to lose by going 
back,” Bruecker said.  “But with free 
movement, workers can respond more to the 
business cycle, creating a more flexible labor 
force.”54  On the political front, he points out 
that for national elected officials, the EU has 
been a convenient scapegoat on migration and 
other delicate issues.  “They can say, ‘don’t 
blame me, it’s those international bureaucrats 
who are making the decisions.’”  This, 
combined with the obvious benefits of travel 
freedom within the EU, has helped maintain 




















The different approach to inequality in the 
EU is reflected in the language of official EU 
documents.   
 
SOCIAL EXCLUSION:  Where in the 
United States the term “poverty” would be 
used, EU documents in the 1980s began to 
use the term “social exclusion.”  A definition 
of the term from a Commission document:  
“when people are prevented from 
participating fully in economic, social, and 
civil life and/or when their access to income 
and other resources (personal, family social 
and cultural) is so inadequate as to exclude 
them from enjoying a standard of living and 
quality of life that is acceptable by the society 
in which they live.”55  According to Edinboro 
University professor Suzanne McDevitt, 
“Social exclusion restores the dignity of the 
poor and disadvantaged.  The predominant 
U.S. model has been to blame the poor for 
their poverty.”56
 
SOCIAL COHESION:  The term “social 
cohesion” was first used in the Single 
European Act (1987) at the insistence of the 
poorer states and originally referred to 
inequality between countries.  Only later was 
the term used to refer to problems within 
countries.  Trinity College professor James 
Wickham explains that “in a socially cohesive 
society, people take some responsibility for 
each other even if they do not share any 




FINANCIAL SOLIDARITY:  The 
European Commission’s Department on 
Regional Policy, responsible for administering 
and monitoring development funding, is 
described as an “instrument of financial 
solidarity,” because it aims to benefit citizens 
and regions that are in some way economically 
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C.  AGRICULTURE 
 
Agriculture is one of the most contentious 
issues in the FTAA negotiations.  In part, 
concerns in the rest of the hemisphere are 
based on the experience of Mexico under 
NAFTA.  According to the World Bank, the 
percentage of the Mexican workforce 
employed in agriculture dropped from 26.9 
percent in 1993 to 17.5 percent in 2000.58  
This was the biggest decline in agricultural 
employment among the proposed FTAA 
countries during this period.  According to the 
Carnegie Endowment, this coincided with a 
loss of 1.3 million jobs in agriculture.
59  At the 
same time, extreme rural poverty in Mexico 
has risen from 51 to 58 percent.60   
 
















1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
 
Source:  World Bank, World Development 
Indicators Online.  Note:  data for 1994 
unavailable. 
 
Mexico’s rural poverty crisis is the result of a 
number of factors.  Prior to joining NAFTA, 
the Mexican government initiated free market 
reforms that made small producers more 
vulnerable.  These included the removal of 
support prices and a constitutional reform to 
allow the sale of collectively held agricultural 
lands on the private market.  Then under 
NAFTA, the Mexican government agreed to a 
timetable for the phased-in lifting of barriers 
to agricultural imports from Canada and the 
United States.  In most years, the Mexican 
government waived restrictions to allow in 
even more imports, based on the belief that 
this would lower consumer food prices.  As a 
result, U.S. corn imports doubled between 
1994 and 2000. 61  Although the influx of 
cheaper U.S. corn resulted in lower prices for 
Mexican industries that use corn, the benefits 
were not passed on to consumers due to 
monopoly pricing of tortillas, a basic staple.62
 
There is a debate over the extent to which the 
sharp increase in U.S. corn imports has led to 
displacement in the Mexican countryside.  For 
example, it is pointed out that in some 
Mexican states, corn production has actually 
increased during the NAFTA period.  
However, as Mexican researcher Alejandro 
Nadal points out, this is likely a sign of 
desperation rather than economic health.  
“Proof of this,” he explains, “is the fact that 
the cultivated surface devoted to corn has 
increased, while yields have dropped.  This 
demonstrates that there is greater pressure on 
existing resources.”63
 
For many Mexican farm groups, anger over 
NAFTA is focused on both the reduction of 
farm protections in Mexico as well as what 
they see as the hypocrisy of U.S. agricultural 
policy, which provides billions of dollars in 
supports for domestic producers (particularly 
large-scale agribusiness) while promoting free 
market reforms abroad.  In early 2003, 
campesino groups marched on the capital and 
threatened to block border crossing points to 
protest NAFTA.  In response, President 
Vicente Fox agreed to push the U.S. and 
Canadian governments to renegotiate 
NAFTA tariffs on some commodities.  So far, 
however, there has been little concrete action. 
 
If the FTAA is based on the NAFTA model, 
other governments in the Americas could face 
similar rural crises.  Without protections, 
many farmers in these countries would be 
vulnerable to being displaced by competition 
with large-scale operations, especially in the 
United States, that benefit from chemical- and 
capital-intensive practices and often heavy 
subsidies.  Agriculture is still an important 
source of income in many countries in the 
region, employing more than 10 percent of 
the workforce in at least 18 of the 34 
countries engaged in the FTAA negotiations.64  
(By contrast, the percentage in the United 
States is less than 2 percent.)   
Currently, millions of small farmers in the 
Americas enjoy protection for the staple 
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foods they grow.  For example, Nicaragua 
charges tariff rates of 45-55 percent on certain 
types of corn and rice imports.65  Costa Rica 
has also used a temporary import duty, called 
a “salvaguarda,” to protect domestic rice 
growers.  This duty was set at 52.8 percent 
early in 2002.66  Colombia has also used a 
price-band system to place higher duties on 
imports of 13 products when prices fall below 
a set floor in the band.  The U.S. 
government’s negotiating position in the 
FTAA has been for countries to remove all 
tariffs on imports within 10 years.   
 
The EU Approach 
 
While NAFTA focuses narrowly on lifting 
barriers to agricultural trade, EU agricultural 
policy has combined trade liberalization with 
massive subsidies for farmers in member 
states.  Thus, NAFTA pits Mexican farmers 
with little government support against heavily 
subsidized Canadian and U.S. farmers, 
whereas in the EU, farmers in all member 
states can benefit from aid funds in the 
collective EU budget.  This approach 
supports the principle identified in the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of 
“financial solidarity.”   
 
The overriding goal of the CAP, however, has 
been to boost yields.  Designed at a time 
when Europeans were still traumatized by 
memories of hunger during World II, the 
focus was on guaranteeing food security by 
increasing productivity.  Since the program 
began in 1963, expenditures have totaled €672 
billion, €45 billion in 2001 alone.  These funds 
are primarily used to cover price supports, the 
cost of buying up and storing surpluses, and 
direct payments to farmers.  Smaller amounts 
are now available for measures linked to the 
environment and structural and rural 
development.  The CAP currently consumes 
about half of the EU’s annual budget, down 
from more than 70 percent in the past.67   
 
There is no question that the CAP has been 
successful in reducing dependence on food 
imports.  Whereas the region produced only 
80 percent of total consumption needs when 
the program was introduced in 1962, it now 
produces 120 percent.68  This increase has 
coincided with a significant drop in the 
percentage of household expenditure on food.  
However, at the same time, the CAP has been 
one of the most controversial EU policies.  
Reforms have been ongoing, with the most 
recent announced in 2003.  The following 




The harshest criticism of the CAP is focused 
on the policy’s environmental record.  A 
major concern has been the CAP’s narrow 
focus on food security.  Farm payments have 
been based on production levels, which has 
encouraged farmers to boost yields through 
chemical- and energy-intensive forms of 
agriculture, with little regard for the 
detrimental impacts on the environment and 
animal welfare.   
 
Over the years, the European Commission 
has attempted to respond to these complaints 
through a number of initiatives.  In 1975, the 
EU issued a “Less Favoured Areas” (LFAs) 
directive to compensate farmers working in 
mountainous and other marginal regions.  The 
impact has been mixed.  On the one hand, it 
has had benefits by helping to sustain farmers 
in low-intensity farming systems.  On the 
other, it may have been detrimental to 
conservation efforts because the form of 
support that was used up until the 1990s was 
based on the number of livestock units, 
thereby encouraging high stock densities.69   
 
In the late-1980s, a “set-aside” scheme was 
introduced that was expected to have positive 
environmental impacts by taking land out of 
production.  In practice, in arid regions such 
as in Spain, it sometimes created further 
problems by leading to land abandonment 
and associated problems of soil erosion as 
well as increased intensification of farming on 
remaining land.70   
 
The first major reform of the CAP was in 
1992.  One key element was a regulation 
requiring member governments to develop 
“agri-environmental” policies.  National 
governments could receive EU co-funding for 
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projects to promote environmentally friendly 
forms of farming.  A related objective was to 
provide income support for small farmers 
who used sustainable practices.71  Specifically, 
funding was made available for activities to 
reduce agri-chemicals (including conversion to 
organic farming); convert arable land into 
grassland; reduce livestock densities; raise 
endangered breeds; manage abandoned farms 
or woodlands; set-aside farmland for at least 
20 years; and manage land for public access.  
Agri-environmental funds are paid on an 
annual basis to farmers who undertake 
commitments for a minimum of five years.72  
The 1992 reform also included mechanisms, 
such as quotas, to reduce surpluses.   
 
A second major CAP reform in 2000 
introduced more environmental policies, as 
well as initiative on food quality and safety.  
However, agri-environmental measures still 
made up only about five percent of the total 
CAP budget.  Nevertheless, there have been 
some positive impacts.  First, it is worth 
noting that as a result of the new regulation, 
some EU governments adopted agri-
environmental programs for the first time.  
Secondly, some individual projects appear to 
have been quite successful.  One of the most 
ambitious was a project initiated in 1993 to 
address serious problems created by 
overexploitation of groundwater resources for 
irrigated farming in the southern central 
plateau of Spain.  Previously, the CAP had 
contributed to the problem by boosting prices 
for corn, a basic crop in the area.  This 
motivated the drilling of wells to begin 
irrigation on more than 100,000 hectares 
between 1975 and 1988, leading to severe 
water shortages.  The goal of the 1993 project 
was to recover the wetlands of the National 
Park “Tablas de Daimiel” by reducing water 
extractions from the aquifers.  By 1997, 
almost 3,000 of the 8,400 farms in the area 
had volunteered to participate by reducing 
their water use (by planting less crops with 
high water demand and other means) in 
exchange for income payments.  As a result, 




Impact on Small Farmers 
 
At the time of the founding of the CAP in 
1962, ministers of the original six member 
states emphasized the importance of small 
family farmers in supporting social stability.
74  
They made sure that one of the key missions 
of the CAP would be to ensure a “fair 
standard of living” for farmers.  And over its 
history, the EU has spent more on subsidies 
to farmers than on any other budget item.  
However, the CAP’s mission does not include 
maintaining farm employment.  To the 
contrary, its focus on boosting productivity 
has put small-scale producers at a 
disadvantage.  Thus, despite massive 
agricultural spending, the CAP has not 
prevented a decline in farm employment.  
Although it occurred more gradually than in 
Mexico, every EU member state has 
experienced a significant decline in agricultural 
employment.  Mexico’s agricultural 
employment dropped 9.4 percent over six 
years, while the EU’s “poor four” nations, 
which have had by far the highest percentages 
of workers employed in agriculture in the EU, 
saw similar levels of decline over a 13-year 
period (1985-1998).75   
 
Poor four:  % of workforce in agriculture 
   1985 1990  1995  1998
Greece  28.9 23.9 20.4 17.8
Ireland  15.6 15.1 11.7  9.1
Portugal 23.8 17.9 11.5 13.5
Spain  18.3 11.8 9.2  8
Source:  World Bank, World Development 
Indicators Online. 
 
Small farms have declined most rapidly.  
Between 1987 and 1997, there was a drop in 
the number of all farms in the EU of 24 
percent, whereas farms of 5 hectares or less 
dropped by 40 percent in Spain and Portugal 
and by about 70 percent in Ireland.
76  
Throughout the EU there is a general trend 
towards larger farm sizes.  This is perhaps not 
surprising, given that the subsidy system has 
disproportionately benefited large producers.  
Because of the linkage between payments and 
production, the largest 20 percent of farms 
have received 70 percent of CAP money.  
While small farmers account for nearly 40 
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percent of EU farms, they receive only 8 
percent of subsidies.77    
 
Impact of High Expenditures  
 
The large sums spent through the CAP have 
been criticized as wasteful, particularly when 
they have resulted in mountains of surplus 
commodities.  This was particularly a problem 
in the early 1980s, when a world recession 
lowered demand for EU agricultural products, 
resulting in massive stocks and some 70 
percent of the Community budget spent on 
the CAP.
78  While spending levels have 
dropped considerably, critics argue that farm 
subsidies are still too high, particularly 
because they make it difficult for developing 
country producers to compete with EU 
farmers.  According to the Catholic Agency 
for Overseas Development (CAFOD), the 
EU accounts for 90 percent of the world’s 
agricultural export subsidies. 79  The 
impending enlargement of the EU has raised 
additional concerns because it will further 




In July 2003, the European Commission 
responded to many of the common criticisms 
of the CAP by introducing a set of proposals 
for significant CAP reform.  These include:  
 
•  de-linkage of subsidies from production 
as a way to reduce the incentive to 
overproduce, 
•  new subsidies in the form of “single farm 
payments” conditioned on respect for 
environmental, food safety and animal 
welfare standards,  
•  a ceiling on payments to large farmers, 
and 
•  increased spending on rural development, 
funded through savings from reduced 
payments to large farmers.   
 
These changes are scheduled to go into effect 
between 2004 and 2007.  According to the 
European Commission, the new CAP policies 
reflect recognition of the “multi-functionality” 
of European agriculture, the notion that 
farmers, in addition to producing food, “play 
a key part in protecting and maintaining the 
environment and the countryside, together 
with its rich cultural heritage of tradition and 
knowledge.”80
 
It is too early to judge whether these changes 
will be effective.  However, initial responses 
from some environmental groups were 
strongly negative.  The World Wildlife Fund 
complained that budget increases for rural 
development were inadequate and questioned 
whether they would actually enforce 
requirements that farmers meet 
environmental criteria for receiving 
payments.
81  Friends of the Earth Europe also 
pointed out that environmental enforcement 
has been extremely weak in the past and there 
was not much reason to expect improvement 
under the new reform.
82
 
Negotiations over accession have also pushed 
the European Commission to wrestle with its 
vision for small-scale sustainable farming in 
Europe.  The issue was most central to 
negotiations with Poland.  Currently, almost 
20 percent of Poland’s workforce is employed 
in agriculture – more than four times as high 
as in the current average for EU member 
states.  Average farm size – at 7.5 hectares – is 
less than half the current EU average.83  
Throughout the negotiations, the EC stressed 
the need for reforms to make Poland’s 
agricultural sector more economically 
efficient, even though these changes would 
undoubtedly lead to large-scale loss of farm 
livelihoods.  In the face of strong rural 
resistance to joining the EU, the Polish 
government pressed for terms that would 
allow a more gradual shift away from 
subsistence agriculture, combined with 
substantial support for rural development and 
alternative job creation.  Polish farmers will 
also receive some direct aid from Brussels, but 
at lower levels than farmers in current EU 
states until the year 2013.  As one EC official 
put it, there will be changes and some 
reduction in agricultural employment, but no 
“big bang.” 
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D.  SOCIAL STANDARDS 
 
The EU Model 
 
From the onset, the entity that evolved into 
the European Union had a mission that 
encompassed social as well as economic goals.  
The founding Treaty of Rome states that “It 
shall be the aim of the Commission to 
promote close collaboration between member 
states in the social field, particularly in matters 
relating to employment, labor legislation and 
working conditions, social security, protection 
against occupational accidents and diseases, 
industrial hygiene, the law as to trade unions, 
and collective bargaining between employers 
and workers.”   
 
However, the EU did not take on much of a 
role as social standard sheriff until after the 
enlargement in the 1970s to include Ireland, 
the United Kingdom and Denmark.  During 
this phase, a major focus of social policy 
activity was in the area of gender equality, 
including three EU directives banning sex-
based discrimination in pay, employment and 
social insurance.  The driving force was both 
altruistic and economic.  The French 
government feared that unless the EU 
mandated gender equality in pay, the relatively 
high pay levels enjoyed by French women 
would undercut the country’s 
competitiveness.  
 
For much of the 1980s, the EU was locked in 
a battle over social policy, with British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher fighting for the 
right to maintain a hands-off approach and 
other members pushing for higher minimum 
standards.  The momentum behind a more 
active social policy role was driven by a 
number of factors.  For example, in the early 
part of that decade, the EU was in the process 
of negotiating expansion to Southern Europe, 
where social protections and labor costs were 
lower than in existing member states.  There 
were strong fears that unless more was done 
to lift up standards, there would be an 
increase in “social dumping,” as firms shifted 
production to take advantage of lower 
standards.84 In the late 1980s, EC President 
Delors further intensified pressure for strong 
EU-wide social protections, arguing that they 
were necessary to mitigate potential negative 
impacts on workers and the environment 
resulting from the formation of the Single 
European Market in 1992. 
 
Thus, despite British objections, all member 
states but the United Kingdom adopted in 
1989 the “Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights for Workers,” 
which lays out a number of rights that are to 
be guaranteed in the EU labor market.  These 
cover: 
 
•  freedom of movement,  
•  social protection,  
•  freedom of association and collective 
bargaining,  
•  employment and pay,  
•  living and working conditions,  
•  vocational training,  
•  gender equity, 
•  information and participation,  
•  workplace health and safety 
•  protections for children, elderly and the 
disabled.   
 
The Charter’s objectives were incorporated by 
annex as a “Social Policy Protocol” into the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992.85  The 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty incorporated the Social 
Protocol within the main body of the treaty 
and included a number of amendments 
related to combating discrimination on the 
basis of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, age or sexual orientation.   
 
Currently, the Charter itself is not legally 
binding, but parts of it are the basis for EU 
directives, regulations, and decisions that must 
be transposed into national legislation.86  One 
major advancement in the Maastricht Treaty 
was that it allowed the European Council to 
take decisions on some areas by qualified 
majority, meaning that unanimity is not 
required.  This applies to the areas of 
improvements in the working environment to 
protect employees; working conditions; 
information and consultation of workers; 
equal opportunities for men and women on 
the labor market and equal treatment at work; 
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and occupational integration of people 
excluded from the labor market.  Unanimous 
approval is still required on votes regarding 
social security, job security, worker 
participation, employment of third-country 
nationals and job creation.  The EU thus far 
has chosen not to take action on setting 




For the debate in the Americas, it is 
particularly important to examine the EU’s 
approach to enforcement of social standards.  
This is a controversial issue because of fears 
that richer countries will manipulate such 
standards for narrow protectionist purposes 
to maintain an economic advantage over the 
poor.  The EU has attempted to ameliorate 
such concerns in at least three ways.  One is 
by emphasizing compliance and offering 
poorer countries considerable financial and 
technical support to help them achieve the 
required standards.  The second is that the 
authorities responsible for monitoring and 
adjudication, the European Commission and 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), are 
supra-national, which helps to distance them 
from narrow national or political interests.  
And finally, there appears to be no rush to 
punishment in the EU system.   
 
Here is how it works.  The European 
Commission monitors implementation of all 
EU laws and investigates charges of 
noncompliance filed by individuals or 
member states.  When the Commission finds 
evidence of a breach, it requests that the 
country take action to meet its obligations.  If 
the national authorities fail to remedy the 
problem within a specified period of time, the 
Commission can refer the matter to the ECJ.   
 
If the Court rules against the country, the 
government still has a substantial (some say 
too substantial) period of time during which it 
can come into compliance without facing a 
penalty.  If it does not, the Commission can 
issue a second opinion urging compliance.  If 
the government again flouts the law, the 
Commission can take the government before 
the ECJ a second time and recommend a 
specific sanction, often a daily fine.  If the 
Court rules against the country, it can then 
impose a sanction.  In addition to cases 
referred by the Commission, the ECJ also has 
jurisdiction over cases referred by national 
courts that involve an interpretation of EU 
law. 
 
Civil society organizations point to several 
instances in which they were able to obtain 
rights only through EU-level action.  The EU, 
after a slow start, has taken a particularly 
strong stance in defending women’s rights.  
Article 119 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome states 
that member states must ensure and maintain 
the principle that men and women receive 
equal pay for equal work.  This article was 
largely ignored until 1975, when the European 
Council issued a directive on equal pay for 
work of equal value, followed a year later by a 
directive that required equal treatment for 
men and women in employment and training.  
Directives in the 1980s and early 1990s dealt 
with equal treatment in social security and 
protections for workers who are pregnant or 
have recently given birth.  The Irish 
government tried to negotiate a waiver from 
the pay equity directive, but the request was 
refused, much to the delight of Irish women’s 
and labor groups who had fought for that 
right.  Likewise in Austria, it was only when 
the EU issued a directive on parental leave 
that the Austrian unions won a long-standing 
battle to obtain that right.87  
 
The European Court of Justice has 
aggressively upheld women’s rights.  For 
instance, the Court ruled in 1998 against a 
Scottish company that had fired a woman 
who had been incapacitated for six months 
due to a pregnancy-related illness.  The Court 
ruled that even though the firm had a contract 
that allowed it to dismiss an employee after an 
extended illness, the firing in this case violated 
EU anti-discrimination standards, since only 
women suffer from pregnancy-related 
disorders. 
 
In recent years, the EU has broadened its 
work on gender equity from a focus on 
discrimination in the workplace to the 
“mainstreaming” of gender issues in its policy 
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making and implementation processes.  New 
EU policy instruments have been created to 
accomplish this goal, such as the collection of 
sex disaggregated data, gender impact 
assessments, and gender auditing of EU 
programs.  This has resulted in studies of the 
gender impacts of a wide range of issues, 
including EU enlargement, globalization, and 
asylum and refugee policy.  However, since 
these instruments are not legally binding, 
there is some skepticism that 
“mainstreaming” will have much impact.   
 
In addition to the progress on women’s 
issues, there is also considerable optimism 
that two relatively new directives will have a 
positive impact in the broader area of 
discrimination.  Adopted in 2000, these 
directives cover sex, disability, religion or 
belief, sexual orientation, age, and racial or 
ethnic origin.  One is known as the Race 
Directive and provides protection in 
education, social security, access to goods and 
services, and cultural life.  The other is the 
Employment Directive, which covers 
employment, self-employment, working 
conditions, membership in workers’ 
organizations, and whistle-blowing.   
 
According to Clarence Lusane of American 
University, “the Race Directive is 
revolutionary because many countries haven’t 
had such legislation.”88  Even in the United 
Kingdom, which is relatively advanced in this 
area, the directives will have an impact, 
according to Lusane.  For example, he points 
out that the Race Directive covers all public 
and private sector entities, whereas UK law 
had exempted firms with six or fewer 
employees.  As Lusane puts it, “This is an 
example of where the collective has been 
more progressive than the individual parts.”  
He notes, however, that the EU member 
states need to develop strong campaigns to 
educate the public about their rights under the 




While the EU has made some significant 
progress in lifting up social standards, it 
should not be overstated.  During the past 
decade in particular, there has been an 
imbalance in emphasis, with economic 
policies taking priority.  As Ronald Janssen of 
the European Trade Union Institute points 
out, budgetary restrictions imposed by the 
European Central Bank (in accordance with 
the Maastricht Treaty) have left many national 
governments with no alternatives to cutting 
wages and social programs.  Meanwhile, 
according to Janssen, the EU Finance 
Ministers, together with the business lobby, 
are constantly pushing policies that would be 
detrimental to workers, such as 
decentralization of wage bargaining and 
reduced unemployment insurance.   
 
Janssen explained that EU labor unions have 
responded by developing new strategies, 
including experiments with international 
sectoral collective bargaining.  “We’re just 
trying to do what the officials have been 
doing for many years,” Janssen said.  There 
was difficulty with fiscal coordination, so they 
got Maastricht and now they say they are 
bound to that.  So the trade unions are now 
saying, for example, that we can’t accept 
wages increases below the inflation rate 
because we’re bound by our own international 
agreement.”89   
 
Clearly, future progress on upward 
harmonization of social standards will depend 
on continued civil society pressure and 
political initiative.   
 
The NAFTA Approach 
 
Under NAFTA, officials recognized that trade 
and investment have social impacts by 
negotiating “side agreements” on labor and 
the environment.  (See Section II.E for a 
discussion of the environmental side 
agreement).  However, 10 years into the 
agreement, it is more clear than ever that 
these side deals were not designed to have any 
significant impact, but were largely meant to 
appease labor and environmental critics of 
NAFTA.  In fact, even at the time of the 
NAFTA debate, negotiators reportedly made 
statements to business lobbyists to calm their 
fears by explaining that the side deals 
wouldn’t actually be enforceable.   
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The labor side agreement (officially, the 
North American Agreement on Labor 
Cooperation (NAALC)) technically has the 
authority to enforce existing laws on a set list 
of labor rights.  However, according to Lance 
Compa, former NAALC Research Director, 
“While Europeans are skeptical about the 
effectiveness of the European Court of 
Justice, there’s no question that it’s far better 
than what we have under NAFTA.  Of what 
you could get out of the ECJ, you could get 
maybe 10 percent of that out of the 
NAALC.”90  
 
The 20-plus cases filed under the NAALC 
have produced little other than increased 
publicity of rights abuses, particularly by U.S. 
corporations in Mexico.  Most cases have 
involved the right to freedom of association, 
which can lead, at most, to inter-governmental 
consultation.  Only violations of health and 
safety, child labor, and minimum wage laws 
may lead to government sanctions.  There is 
no mechanism to penalize corporate violators.  
And unlike in the EU, NAFTA provides no 
financial assistance to help countries achieve 
compliance. 
 
So far, no NAFTA labor case has come 
remotely close to resulting in sanctions.  One 
important test case involved health and safety 
violations at two Mexican factories owned by 
U.S.-based Breed Technologies.  In 2001, the 
agency that investigates charges of labor rights 
violations in the NAFTA countries confirmed 
that the Mexican government had failed to 
ensure that the employer protected the 
workers from dangerous chemical exposure 
and ergonomic conditions.  The case then 
moved on to the stage of ministerial 
consultations, where it has languished.  
Ministers have no deadline by which they 
must either produce results or move a case 
forward and thus, perhaps not surprisingly, no 
case has proceeded past this stage.  In the 
FTAA talks, negotiators have actually taken a 
step backwards from NAFTA, since thus far 
they have not even developed side agreements 
on labor and the environment. 
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E.  ENVIRONMENTAL  
STANDARDS 
 
The EU and NAFTA approaches to the 
environment are distinct in a number of ways.  
First, the environmental side accord to 
NAFTA has the stated goal of strengthening 
enforcement only of existing environmental 
regulations.  By contrast, the EU aims to 
harmonize environmental standards upwards.  
A major goal for the EU is to reduce 
“environmental dumping,” or competition on 
the basis of lax environmental enforcement 
 
Beginning in the 1970s, the EU launched a 
series of multi-year environmental action 
programs aimed at improving environmental 
protections, focusing on areas that would 
benefit most from a regional approach.   
Currently, EU environmental legislation 
covers a wide range of issues, including air 
and water quality standards, nature 
conservation, waste management, climate 
change, industrial accidents, nuclear safety and 
radiation protection, and protection of coastal 
and urban areas.  Environmental impact 
assessments are also required on all relevant 
EU policies. 
 
Under NAFTA’s environmental side 
agreement, the Commission on 
Environmental Cooperation (CEC) was 
created to promote joint projects on 
environmental issues and hear complaints 
about failures to enforce existing 
environmental laws.  As of January 2004, the 
CEC had received 42 citizen submissions 
regarding charges of failure to enforce 
environmental laws.  However, the most that 
the CEC can do in response to these citizen 
complaints is investigate and publish a report.  
Only government-initiated complaints can 
lead to fines or trade sanctions, and thus far, 
none have been filed.    
 
In the EU, the European Commission 
monitors compliance with EU environmental 
laws and can bring offending governments 
before the European Court of Justice.  In 
2002 alone, the EC brought 71 environmental 
cases before the ECJ (out of a total of 452 
ECJ cases).  Sometimes these cases result 
from complaints submitted to the EC by 
environmental groups against their own 
governments.   
 
However, despite the EC’s willingness to 
pursue court proceedings, member states 
continue to breach many of their 
environmental obligations.  For any given 
directive, there are several member states that 
are in some stage of EC infringement 
proceedings or investigations.   One reason 
for this may be that proceedings related to 
noncompliance can drag out for years and 
there are few instances in which the ECJ has 
actually imposed fines on violators.   One 
exception was a case in 2000 in which the ECJ 
levied a fine of $19,000 per day on Greece for 
failing to clean up a toxic waste dump near 
tourist beaches in Crete.  However, this action 
came 13 years after the EC first cited the 
dump as a violation of EU law.91  Critics also 
charge that environmental enforcement is 
constrained by the fact that the EC must rely 
on national-level environmental reporting 
systems, which are lacking in many 
countries.92
 
Nevertheless, there are examples of EU 
environmental laws that have had significant 
impact.  For example, a directive on large 
combustion plants sets emissions limits that 
are more easily attained with modern and 
cleaner natural gas technologies.  This law is 
cited as at least partly responsible for a 
reduction of energy-related emissions in the 
energy supply and industry sectors of 43 and 
23 percent, respectively, during the past 
decade.93  The European Commission also 
points to a law on urban wastewater that has 
resulted in a significant decrease in the 
number of heavily polluted rivers due to 
reductions in point source discharges.  
Organic matter discharges fell by 50 to 80 
percent over the last 15 years.94  
 
Another distinction between the EU and 
NAFTA approaches is that the EU has gone 
further, at least on paper, to attempt to 
balance environment and commercial 
interests.  For example, the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty recognized two important 
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environmental principles.  First it states that 
policy should be based on the “precautionary 
principle” (i.e., in the absence of scientific 
certainty about an environmental threat, take 
the most cautious course of action).  This is in 
stark contrast to NAFTA, which requires 
countries to meet certain scientific burdens of 
proof in setting their standards and to show 
that laws and regulations are “necessary.”  
Secondly, the Treaty recognizes the “polluter 
pays principle,” which means that polluters 
should be held accountable for environmental 
costs through, for example, taxes on 
packaging or recycling requirements.  Again, 
in contrast, NAFTA includes no measures to 
hold corporations accountable for 
environmental degradation.  In fact, some 
claim that NAFTA’s investment rules turn the 
polluter pays principle on its head.  These 
protections allow foreign investors to sue 
governments directly for any government acts 
that diminish their potential profits.  In 
numerous cases to date, such suits have 
targeted environmental regulations. 
 
Within the EU, however, there remain strong 
blocs of resistance to environmental 
initiatives.  For example, efforts to obtain a 
common CO2/energy tax and minimum 
excise tax rates on all energy products have 
been blocked.  Because it is a fiscal measure, 
this initiative would require unanimous 
support from the EU Council, which has been 
lacking.95  
 
A final sharp distinction between the NAFTA 
and EU approaches is in environmental 
funding.  NAFTA’s environmental side 
agreement established the Border 
Environmental Cooperation Commission 
(BECC), to help communities develop clean-
up projects and certify projects for financing, 
as well as the North American Development 
Bank (NADBank), to arrange financing for 
BECC-certified projects.  So far, the 
NADBank has provided only about $500 
million for border environmental projects, a 
tiny fraction of the sums needed for 
infrastructure adequate to handle the 





Structural Funds Expenditure on the 
Environment, 1994-1999  
(EUR millions, 1994 prices) 
 
Water treatment and distribution   6,970.5
Natural environment management 
and protection  1,458.1
Waste collection and treatment   651.9
Industrial site clean up  162.0
Forestry 103.8
Research, training, other  99.2
Total 9,445.5
Source:  European Commission, 2nd Report on 
Economic and Social Cohesion, Annex, Table A.41 
 
By contrast, the EU has committed a 
substantial amount through Structural and 
Cohesion Funds to facilitate compliance with 
EU environmental law.  During the period 
1994-1999, total funds spent were €9.4 billion, 
for a variety of environmental projects.  One 
specific example of EU support for 
compliance is the estimated €3 billion in 
Cohesion Funds contributed over a 12-year 
period to support Spain’s projected €10 
billion investment needed to come into 
compliance with the directive on urban 
wastewater.96  Such funding has helped 
persuade some reluctant EU member states to 
accept the imposition of higher environmental 
standards.   
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F.  PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 
 
The EU Model 
 
The EU institutional framework offers several 
avenues for civil society input.  The European 
Trade Union Confederation, which represents 
most labor unions in the region, is an official 
“social partner,” along with two employers 
associations, the Union of Industries of the 
European Community and the European 
Centre for Public Enterprises.  These three 
partners hammer out joint agreements, 
including some that have led to EU directives, 
such as those on parental leave and part-time 
work.   
 
Another EU entity, the European Economic 
and Social Committee (EESC), is made up of 
representatives of employers, workers, and 
other civil society sectors from each member 
state.  The purpose of the EESC is to play an 
advisory role on social and economic issues.  
Eva Belabed, a Committee member from 
Austria, claims that the process has helped 
build consensus around a European model of 
society.  For example, she said the dialogue 
tends to have a moderating influence on 
British employers who typically are those 
most eager to adopt relatively unregulated 
U.S.-style labor policies.  “When these Brits 
have to sit at a negotiating table with unions 
as well as employers from Scandinavia and 
other countries with more cooperative styles, 
they usually change a lot,” she explained.97
 
EU workers also have rights to consultation at 
the company level.  Since 1994, multinational 
companies with a significant number of 
workers in the EU must negotiate agreements 
with a “European Works Council” 
representing their employees.  At a minimum, 
employers must give the EWCs the right to 
meet with central management once a year to 
receive information regarding the firm’s 
financial situation and plans for new 
technologies, production transfers, mergers, 
and layoffs.  In some cases, the agreement 
gives expanded rights.  For example, France-
based Danone must consider union proposals 
to avoid layoffs and attempt to transfer 
workers to other positions before laying them 
off.98  In all cases, the corporation must pay 
for the EWC’s operating expenses. 
 
Thus far, the EWCs have not met their full 
potential.  Only about 650 out of the 1,900 or 
so firms that are technically required to have 
EWCs actually have complied, and in most 
cases, the agreements offer the bare 
minimum.  Nevertheless, EWCs offer some 




•  The EWC meetings give worker 
representatives the opportunity to gather 
information that may be useful in their 
national collective bargaining.  Andrzej 
Matla from the Polish Solidarnosc trade 
union said that the inclusion of employee 
representatives from central and eastern 
European countries in EWCs was “the 
most effective and sometimes nearly the 
only way for them to obtain information 
on multinational companies’ operations at 
the European and global level.”99 
 
•  The EWC directive can also influence 
corporate restructurings.  In 1997, a 
French court ruled that the Renault car 
company had not respected its obligation 
to inform and consult with the Renault 
EWC prior to its announcement of the 
closure of a factory in Vilvoorde, 
Belgium.  The court ordered the company 
to stop pursuing the closure until it had 
fulfilled its obligation.  The Belgian 
government also strengthened its national 
legislation on layoffs, requiring firms to 
inform the works councils of the 
intention to close, give them a chance to 
offer a counter-proposal, and consider 
these proposals.100  Today, there are still 
between 100 and 200 workers at the 
Vilvoorde plant who otherwise would 
have lost their jobs.101 
 
•  One example of an EWC playing an 
influential role in the handling of 
restructuring was in the case of a plan by 
General Motors to cut 6,000 jobs and 
shut down a plant in Luton, United 
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Kingdom.  When the EWC of GM 
Europe learned of the plan in December 
2000, it called for a Europe-wide GM 
Action Day.  In response, 40,000 workers 
participated in rallies during working 
hours in five countries (UK, Germany, 
Spain, Portugal, and Belgium).  The 
workers demanded that GM management 
negotiate an alternative to the shutdown.  
According to Peter Booth, a union official 
at the Transport and General Workers 
Union, GM later agreed to a moratorium 
on closures and to discuss all future 
moves with the EWC.102   
 
•  According to Willy Buschak, Deputy 
Director of the European Foundation for 
the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions, EWCs have also helped to 
build international solidarity among 
workers.  “Before we had EWCs, most 
interaction between unions was at the top 
level, between union presidents, or maybe 
the one thousand or so unionists from 
around the world who could attend the 
congress of the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions.  
Today, we have more than 32,500 
workers involved in EWCs.”  Buschak 
pointed to two concrete examples which 
he claims illustrates the increase in trust 
resulting from the EWCs.  In a case 
before the EWC directive, the U.S.-based 
Hoover corporation announced plans to 
move a vacuum cleaner plant from 
France to Scotland.  In France, rumors 
flew that the Scottish trade union had 
betrayed the French workers by offering 
to work weekends in order to lure the 
plant to their city.  By contrast, Buschak 
points out that in the Renault case 
mentioned above, EWCs helped prevent 
such distrust between workers and as a 
result, there was strong cooperation 
between the Belgian and French trade 
unions.103 
 
According to an ILO report, “The 
establishment of EWCs has not restored the 
balance of power between management and 
labour, which has been dramatically affected 
by globalization of the economy.  On the 
other hand, an EWC, or an information or 
consultation procedure, offer a bridge for 
social dialogue across boundaries, which 
otherwise might not be there.”104   
 
Trade unionists also cite a potential problem 
with “consultation burnout” among civil 
society representatives to various EU 
committees.  Andreas Botsch, of the German 
Labor Federation, said “if these consultation 
meetings in Brussels were like the Olympics, I 
would have certainly won a medal by now.”
105  
He points out that representatives from the 
new EU countries face a considerable 
challenge in making full use of the 
opportunities for consultation because of 
their limited personnel and capacity to make 
the time invested pay off.   
 
The NAFTA Approach 
 
Neither NAFTA nor the proposed FTAA 
offers any significant opportunities for public 
participation.  The agencies set up under the 
NAFTA labor and environmental side 
agreements have advisory committees in each 
country with trade union, employer, and 
"public" (sometimes NGO, usually 
academics) involvement.  The tri-national 
secretariat for the environmental agreement 
has a public advisory board as well, but the 
labor one does not.  However, these advisors 
are invited to conferences, but they have no 
real voice or effect beyond this kind of 
superficial participation. 
 
A civil society committee set up as part of the 
FTAA negotiation process is widely derided 
as nothing more than a “mailbox,” since it 
solicits public input but has no obligation to 
respond.  And there is nothing in the draft 
FTAA text that would ensure any continued 
role for civil society once the agreement went 
into effect.  At the company level, neither 
NAFTA nor the draft FTAA offer any 
consultation rights to workers.   
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In this report, we have attempted to offer 
ideas and insights regarding the strengths and 
weakness of the distinct approaches to 
integration in Europe and the Americas that 
deserve further exploration.  However, we 
would be remiss if we did not acknowledge 
that during our discussions with EU experts 
from many countries on the prospects for 
applying some of their lessons in the 
Americas, we encountered a great deal of 
skepticism.   
 
These doubts were heightened by the 
reputation of the current U.S. administration, 
particularly among Europeans, as one that 
lacks patience for international cooperation 
and is unwilling to adhere to international 
institutions or treaties that impinge on 
national sovereignty.  Given this, how could 
one expect such a superpower to support an 
approach to integration that emphasizes 
cooperation and solidarity?   
 
We asked many German experts and officials 
for their thoughts, with the idea that they, as 
citizens of the richest country in that region, 
might have insights into the feasibility of 
building support for a more cooperative 
approach in the richest country of the 
Americas.  The most common response was 
one of deep skepticism, based on the opinion 
that the evolution of the EU, and Germany’s 
role in it, are inextricably linked with Europe’s 
unique history.   
 
For example, Jan Delhey, of the 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fuer 
Sozialforschung, claims that World War II 
resulted in three conditions that were 
necessary to the EU’s formation:  “You need 
to have an extraordinarily negative event to 
have the will to do it.  You need strong 
support from leaders.  We had Monnet, 
Churchill, Adenauer, Schuman – key players 
who had all suffered from war and wanted to 
create a different kind of community.  And 
you also need big countries to support it.  For 
Germany, the only opportunity to get back in 
politics was through the Union.  Perhaps we’d 
even still be occupied if they hadn’t joined.  
Coming out of the war, Germany had to 
accept reduced sovereignty and also had to 
pay to be loved.  For France, they never 
wanted to be defeated by Germany again and 
wanted access to technology and 
resources.”
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Others suggested that the lack of a common 
identity and bonds of trust in the Americas 
could be a major obstacle.  According to 
Christian Weise, of the EC’s Budget 
Department, “There must be trust in the 
receiver.  You can have some controls on 
what’s done with the funds, but you must also 
have a basic feeling of togetherness, which I 
think we have in Europe and I don’t see in 
the Americas.”107
 
And even as the EU boldly takes on the 
challenge of integrating the much poorer 
countries of Eastern Europe into the fold, 
many were daunted by the even more vast 
gaps in the Americas.  The poorest country in 
the expanded EU, Latvia, might be worse off 
than Mexico, but it is rich compared to Haiti, 
Nicaragua, Bolivia, or several other countries 
in the Western Hemisphere. 
 
We acknowledge the validity of these points.  
However, one could also argue that the 
current moment is an auspicious one for 
beginning an official dialogue towards 
building a new, broader approach to 
integration that would draw general lessons 
from the EU experience.   
 
First of all, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult, if not impossible, for the U.S. 
government to continue to advance an agenda 
based on narrow trade and investment 
liberalization rules.  Referring to this 
approach, Brazil’s President Inacio Lula de 
Silva stated at a recent meeting of his Western 
Hemisphere counterparts, “it is a perverse 
model that wrongly separated the economic 
from the social.”  Argentine President Nestor 
Kirchner echoed Lula’s comments by stating 
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At their most recent meeting, the trade 
ministers of the Americas were able to break a 
deadlock only by agreeing to a framework for 
talks that is likely to lead to a weak agreement 
that will fail to satisfy the corporate lobby that 
has been the driving force behind the FTAA.   
The current approach is also increasingly 
unpopular among the U.S. public.  A recent 
Zogby poll, for example, indicated strong 
resistance to the Bush Administration’s goal 
of expanding NAFTA.  The poll found that 
half of Americans oppose NAFTA expansion, 
compared with only 31 percent in favor.  And 
those who described NAFTA as a job-
destroyer outnumbered those who saw it as a 
job-creator by 3 to 1.109  With the NAFTA 
model facing a dismal outlook, it would seem 
most sensible for the U.S. government to 
broaden the talks to consider alternative 
approaches.   
 
Secondly, at a time when the U.S. government 
remains focused on the war on terrorism, it is 
an important time to draw from the EU’s 
experience with promoting stability and 
reducing poverty amongst its member states.  
U.S. officials have often argued that there is a 
link between poverty and global security.  For 
example, Secretary of State Colin Powell has 
stated that “terrorism flourishes in areas of 
poverty and despair.”   
 
This reasoning motivated the Administration, 
in the wake of September 11, to create the 
Millennium Challenge Accounts, a new U.S. 
aid initiative.  This policy, however, falls far 
short of a concerted effort to narrow the gaps 
in living standards.  A more targeted effort in 
the Americas could be a first step in a new, 
long-term international security strategy based 
on cooperation.  This could help make 
Americans not only safer but more 
economically secure, since the current gaps in 
standards make it nearly impossible to reduce 
incentives for companies to export U.S. jobs 
to areas of low wages and lax environmental 
enforcement.  The EU experience also 
demonstrates the benefits to the richer 
countries when their neighbors can better 
afford to purchase their products and services.   
 
Given the many differences between Europe 
and the Americas — in our histories, our 
economies, our natural resources, our cultures 
— it would be foolish to attempt to simply 
replicate the EU model.  But the EU 
experience remains valuable as a concrete 
example of an alternative path, and one that 
could offer our nations at least some direction 
as we make our own way forward. 
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